Abstract
and ambiguity. Because it is easier to prepare to execute a specific strategy than it is to prepare for a very broad range of possibilities, military preparedness suffers-at least at the strategic level-under a policy of ambiguity. It is not surprising, therefore, that the policy of calculated ambiguity, which intends to place doubt in the minds of potential adversaries, has at the same time engendered uncertainty among those who would have to implement the policy. This uncertainty could manifest itself in strategic unpreparedness.
I argue in this paper that the U.S. needs a more clear reprisal policy, one which strikes a better balance between flexibility and preparedness.
In general, national policy should facilitate strategy development. If a policy fails to provide enough substance for making strategy, the policy ought to be revised. Adjectives such as -overwhelming" and -devastating" are the only guidelines the -calculated ambiguity" policy provides to strategy makers. Because the current policy aims to achieve unlimited flexibility through ambiguity, there is simply not enough substance in the policy to support strategy development. Absent a strategy, military means may not be able to support policy ends. In making the case that the current reprisal policy hampers strategic preparedness, I will first examine current policy and assess its strengths and weaknesses. Then I will suggest means for clarifying the policy, with a view toward better balancing flexibility and preparedness. Having proposed a policy which better supports strategy development, I will then present a strategic-analytic framework consisting of four critical variables which must be considered in formulating strategies for responding to a chemical or biological attack.
Examination and Assessment of the Current U.S. Reprisal Policy What is the Current Policy?
Former President Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS) calls weapons of mass destruction -the greatest potential threat to global stability and security." 3 The NSS further states, -Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States, our allies and U.S. citizens and troops abroad. More recently, the U.S. has begun to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. 7 The U.S. therefore no longer has the option of responding in kind to a chemical or biological attack. This situation has thrown U.S. retaliation policy into a conundrum: How best to respond to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack when the only WMD in your arsenal is nuclear? Albert and that the U.S. should forswear first use of nuclear weapons. Deterrence theory, long relegated to the proverbial back burner, is witnessing a rebirth, driven in no small part by this U.S. reprisal policy, which, when taken at face value, clearly allows the U.S. to use nuclear weapons in response to something other than a nuclear attack. Deterrence hawks argue that the potential threat to U.S. interests from these attacks is so large, only by threatening absolute devastation with nuclear weapons can the U.S. deter such attacks.
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The deterrence doves, on the other hand, place primacy on countering nuclear proliferation. The doves' position is that the U.S. goal of nuclear nonproliferation will be irreparably damaged if the U.S. continues to maintain a policy which allows nuclear first use. The U.S. should forswear nuclear retaliation, they argue, and instead should threaten a massive conventional response.
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To summarize, current U.S. reprisal policy is vague but threatening. It does not identify specific actions to be taken. Based on statements from the two previous defense secretaries, the current policy in no uncertain terms allows for a nuclear response by the U.S. The essence of U.S. reprisal policy is this: those using CBW against the U.S. or its allies can expect a devastating and overwhelming response. So, to be effective, policy must enable the development of strategy. Gray defines strategy as -the bridge that relates military power to political purpose." 21 -Military strategy," according to Drew and Snow, is -the art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives." 22 Drawing from these definitions, if a policy (political purpose) is not clearly defined, the development of strategy is problematic. Thus, a viable policy must embody clear national security objectives for the development of strategy.
Assessing the Current Policy
The 1998 cruise missile strikes against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan provide an illustration of the thinking of the Clinton administration leadership relative to reprisal policy, and how this U.S. action was intended as both a punishment and a prevention of further attacks. In his address to the nation announcing the strikes, Clinton stated a key reason for the U.S. response was -the imminent threat [the facilities] presented to our national security." 23 Thus, these strikes served several purposes: they sent a strong signal of U.S. willingness to retaliate; they served as a form of punishment against terrorist behavior; and they decreased the likelihood that those facilities could be used again.
Assessing the Current Policy: Shortcomings
Does the current policy of calculated ambiguity meet the stated objective of deterrence, and does it support the development of strategy? When measured against these two key criteria, today's policy has some significant shortcomings. One of the weaknesses of the policy is its credibility. Would a U.S. president really use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a CBW attack? It would seem that the threshold of damage would have to be very high for a president to consider using nuclear weapons, yet the stated policy does not address thresholds of damage. The main reason for the policy's lack of credibility is that it fails to address proportionality. Adjectives such as -overwhelming" and -devastating" in today's policy bring to mind a massive response.
Yet one of the widely held tenets of the international law of armed conflict-the rule of proportionality-holds that armed action -must be measured and not excessive in the sense of being out of proportion to the original wrong nor disproportionate in achieving its redress." 24 Suppose an adversary killed several dozen American soldiers with a biological attack. Taken at face value, the current policy would seem to stipulate a response far out of proportion to the original attack. A disproportional response would surely trigger an international furor over U.S. actions. Moreover, it is not clear that threatening massive retaliation is the best deterrent against CBW use. Avigdor Haselkorn writes in The Continuing Storm, -Frequently, the bigger and more indiscriminate the threat, the less believable it is in the eyes of the target audience." 25 Unfortunately, the current policy's wording may commit the U.S. to a massive response when in reality the situation does not call for an overwhelming retaliation. 26 In their statements, policymakers seem to imply all potential CBW events are equal, with each demanding the same massive response. In reality, of course, future CBW events will vary widely, and U.S. policy should be worded carefully to allow for a tailored response, appropriate to the situation.
A second shortcoming of the current policy is its implicit focus on state actors, when in fact the threat of CBW from non-state entities may be greater than the threat from states. It does not seem likely that Rice's phrase -national obliteration" would have much deterrent effect on terrorist groups. The current policy begs two questions: Does the threat of a nuclear response deter terrorists? Would the U.S. ever launch a nuclear weapon into a sovereign state in response to a terrorist attack? The answer to both questions is -very unlikely." Thus, while terrorists are a highly likely source of CBW attacks, the current policy all but ignores these non-state threats.
A third shortcoming of the current policy is that the policy is so ambiguous that it is of little use to strategy development and planning. Again, if policy is not clear, the development of strategy to support that policy is difficult, if not impossible. The U.S.
reprisal policy of calculated ambiguity lends itself to flexibility for policymakers, but because the policy is so ambiguous, military planners are unable to develop strategies for linking the policy's ends to the means for accomplishing those ends. In other words, the doubt that the policy intends to place in the minds of potential adversaries translates into uncertainty among those who would have to implement the policy. Two outcomes are possible as a result of this disconnection between policy ends and means. First, policymakers may feel compelled to consider the nuclear option because the militarylacking a coherent strategy-is unprepared at the strategic level to execute alternative actions. The other possible outcome resulting from the disconnection is that policymakers may feel they have no realistic options, and thus may opt to do nothing.
Assessing the Current Policy: Strengths
The calculated ambiguity policy does have one very strong feature. The more uncertain your adversary is about your response, the less likely he is to use chemical or biological weapons. As Paul Bernstein and Lewis Dunn write, -…deliberate ambiguity creates significant uncertainty for an adversary regarding the nature of our response to CBW use." 27 In other words, ambiguity deters, as long as the adversary perceives a U.S.
willingness and ability to respond forcefully. Since the ambiguity in the current policy incorporates the possibility of a nuclear retaliation, one must ask, are today's chemicaland biological-capable adversaries deterred by the U.S. threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons? Even Scott Sagan, an articulate advocate of abandoning the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. reprisal policy, concedes that nuclear weapons contribute -the extra margin of deterrence" against CBW use.
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The inherent deterrent value of nuclear weapons is a strength of the current policy, but policymakers must clarify the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be considered.
In summary, the current policy does appear to satisfy the first criterion of a reprisal policy: deterrence. However, as detailed earlier, deterrence is not the only important criterion of a reprisal policy. The next section presents evidence that the current policy, because of its ambiguity, fails to support the development of strategy.
Assessing the Current Policy: Failure to Support Strategy Development
I have argued that the current U.S. reprisal policy has shortcomings which should be redressed, the most important of which is a lack of clarity. The policy is so ambiguous that it hampers the development of strategies which are necessary to implement the policy. There is ample evidence that the policy fails to support strategy development.
Three key pieces of this evidence are presented in this section.
The first piece of evidence demonstrating that the current policy fails to support strategy development is the waffling of the Bush administration during the Gulf War. In There was no consensus on how to respond. 32 In the end, writes Haselkorn, -The ambiguity of the U.S. position on the proper response to Iraq's use of mass destruction weapons was as much a result of the conflicting stands within the Bush administration as it was part of a calculated policy." 33 The widely varying views taken by these individuals, each of whom held a position of influence, should be of great concern. Had a retaliation been called for, uncertainty and lack of consensus among U.S.
political and military leaders would have created difficulties in planning and executing a response.
The second piece of evidence that suggests the current policy is not pragmatic is the persistent stumbling over the issue by the Clinton administration. In An Elusive
Consensus, Janne Nolan concludes that confusion over U.S. reprisal policy persisted throughout the Clinton administration. 34 The most visible issue the Clinton administration grappled with was the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ)
Treaty, in which the U.S. promised not to use nuclear weapons in Africa. To assuage Pentagon concerns, the administration issued a declaration reserving the U.S. right to use nuclear weapons against states which employ weapons of mass destruction against U.S.
interests. In another incident, a senior Pentagon official publicly argued for development of a new, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon which could be targeted against a Libyan chemical weapons plant. Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon had to later issue a clarification, to -correct the impression … that the U.S. had accepted a policy of nuclear preemption against Libya," which would be in violation of the ANWFZ Treaty. 35 This waffling and stumbling on the part of the last two administrations raises the question, is it possible to develop sound military strategy when policy is unclear? The answer appears to be -no." The third piece of evidence that the flawed reprisal policy has hampered strategy development is the disconnect between statements of grand strategy Two things need to change to rectify this situation. First, the policy must be clarified.
Second, the strategy -bridge" linking ends and means must be developed. The next section of the paper will suggest ways to clarify and strengthen the policy, and the subsequent section will present a four-variable framework for strategy development.
Clarifying the Policy: Balancing Flexibility and Preparedness
There are two concrete steps that should be taken to clarify U.S. reprisal policy:
1) make regime survival and/or accountability the hallmark of the policy, and 2) determine under what conditions nuclear weapons would be used.
Rather than making vague threats such as -national obliteration," the primary feature of U.S. reprisal policy should be a guarantee to bring to justice those responsible for a chemical or biological attack. The second major change to current U.S. reprisal policy should be to clarify when nuclear weapons would be used. In today's policy, when to use nuclear weapons is left as an open issue. Some argue this ambiguity enhances deterrence. The mushroom cloud is indeed one of the enduring images of the 20th century, and only the most ardent of the nonproliferators would argue the threat of nuclear weapons has no deterrent effect.
Nuclear weapons may simply be too good of a deterrent to take off the table. Yet, because the current policy provides no guidance on the conditions under which nuclear weapons would be considered, planning and strategy-of both conventional and nuclear responses-have been severely hampered. When, and if, to use nuclear weapons in a reprisal is an enormously controversial issue. Bernstein and Dunn capture the issue well:
There is no way to resolve fully these competing considerations related to what punishment to threaten. It would be dangerous to rule out the possibility of a nuclear response to CBW use, particularly in the face of egregious and highly damaging attacks. But it would be equally imprudent to rely exclusively on nuclear threats for deterrence of CBW use.
Nuclear weapons should be considered only in the most horrifying and damaging attacks.
Policy should reflect the reality that nuclear weapons will be used only in the most extreme circumstances. This will enable planners and strategists to -get on with" the business of planning and developing strategies for conventional responses, which will be the most likely kind of response directed by the president.
Robert Joseph asserts, -…for deterrence to work, the adversary must be convinced of our will and capability to respond decisively. On this score, ambiguity and uncertainty play very much against us."
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My suggestions-to emphasize regime survival/accountability and clarify the role of nuclear weapons-would result in a less ambiguous policy. Given the situation today, in which U.S. planning and strategy have been paralyzed due to an unclear policy, it is time to make these clarifying changes to the policy. The benefit-a clear policy which supports strategy development-outweighs the drawbacks.
Policymakers and strategists need a framework to bound and focus the retaliation problem. The final section of the paper presents a strategic-analytic framework which can be useful to ensure logical thought processes prevail -in the panic of the moment."
Strategic Analytic Framework: Four Critical Variables
How should the U.S. determine its response to a CBW attack? Guided by political objectives inherent in a clearly articulated reprisal policy, the crisis response analysis can proceed by examining four key variables: context (i.e., wartime or peacetime), adversary class, number and type of casualties, and whether we can identify the perpetrators. These four variables form the genesis of an analytic framework which can enable policymakers and planners to begin developing reprisal strategies.
Context
The U.S. response to a -bolt-out-of-the-blue" CBW attack is likely to be far different than if U.S. forces were attacked during a conflict or period of hostilities. During hostilities, the mindset of U.S. leaders and the public is at a higher state of alert. If casualties in a conflict have already occurred from conventional means prior to a CBW attack, the leadership and the public may be somewhat inured and may not react as strongly they would in a peacetime scenario. Moreover, during hostilities, U.S. forces are likely to be utilizing CBW defense equipment, such as masks and detection equipment, which could serve to minimize the adverse impacts of a CBW attack. In fact, depending on the nature and scope of the attack, U.S. forces could -take it in stride", with little if any change in operational plans. In this case, a specific reprisal action may not be necessary.
The international legal standards for retaliation during peacetime are much higher.
Richard Erickson, author of Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored
International Terrorism, makes the point that reprisal has a -very low level of acceptability" in international law. He says, -The general view is that articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN Charter have outlawed peacetime reprisals….When states have relied upon it, the UN Security Council has condemned their action soundly." 45 Thus, reprisals in peacetime will have to pass a more strict set of criteria.
Adversary Class
The second variable to consider in reprisal calculations is adversary class. Is the perpetrator a state or non-state actor? Whereas international law gives clear guidance as to how states may legally respond to attacks from other states, the law is murky when dealing with non-state actors; hence, any proposed U.S. retaliatory action must take this difference into account. For example, despite the evidence and strong justification for its actions against the Afghanistan and Sudan terrorist facilities, the U.S. was subject to much condemnation from the international community, not to mention internal criticism.
U.S. reprisal attacks against non-state actors are likely to require much more evidence and justification compared to similar actions against state actors. There are many kinds of military actions which can be taken against a state actor, whereas the kinds of actions which can be taken against non-state actors may be limited. The nature of the reprisal, therefore, will be heavily influenced by the type of actor involved.
Number and Type of Casualties
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may very well be Besides just the total number of casualties, the type of the casualties-whether predominantly military versus civilian-will also impact the nature and scope of the U.S.
reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as would be the case if the attack were against U.S. civilians.
World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstances which would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event producing a shock and death toll roughly equivalent to the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. Truman's decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki-based on a calculation that up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland 47 -is an example of the kind of thought process which would have to be conducted prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Utgoff suggests, -If nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made."
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Even the -overwhelming and devastating" conventional response threatened by Secretary Perry 49 would seem unlikely unless there were a very large number of Americans or allies killed. In any event, it is imperative that policymakers and planners consider that the number and type of casualties, and the attendant public opinion resulting from those casualties, will play a significant role in determining the nature of U.S. reprisal actions.
Identification of the Perpetrator
Before taking military action against the parties responsible for a CBW attack, the U.S. is compelled to demonstrate that it has strong enough evidence linking the perpetrators to the act itself. How strong does the evidence have to be? Erickson writes:
-The threshold for what constitutes sufficient evidence varies. Factors that must be considered are the threat, the response contemplated, and the audience to be persuaded." 50 Stronger evidence may result in the ability of the U.S. to conduct a stronger response. As a final consideration on the issue of evidence, policymakers must consider the possibility that there could be a large-scale attack with heavy U.S. or allied casualties, yet with insufficient evidence to allow for a reprisal.
In the final analysis, the U.S. response must be determined via a thorough cost/benefit calculation. Decision makers must ask, what are the potential results of a reprisal, both internationally and domestically? Are there any unanticipated consequences? Are there any vulnerabilities in the strategy? These are the kinds of tough questions which must be answered prior to determining a reprisal action. Today's policy, with its reliance on an -overwhelming response," is not useful in many potential situations. It has been, in the words of Bernstein and Dunn, -a false justification for inaction-for avoiding tough resource allocation decisions needed to improve our ability to defend against hostile CBW acts."
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Implications and Conclusion
The suggested policy clarifications and the strategic analytic framework proposed in this paper could serve to bound and focus policy debates and, if implemented, would enable strategists to begin to better link military capabilities with political objectives.
Adapting the policy changes which I recommend has implications for at least two elements of U.S. military power: intelligence and special operations. If regime survival becomes the hallmark of U.S. reprisal policy, then the U.S. intelligence community must be challenged to improve intelligence collection against organizations suspected to be involved with chemical and biological weapons. To be successful in collecting this badly needed intelligence requires new ways of thinking about intelligence, improved cooperation among domestic and allied intelligence agencies, and increased budgets to reflect the national priority and concern for WMD. Being ready to retaliate following a CBW attack against the U.S. also implies an increased emphasis on special operations forces (SOF). In such situations, -SOF, because of their unique skills, regional expertise, cultural sensitivity and operational experience, may be the force of choice for meeting the strategic requirements of the National Command Authorities (NCA)…" 52 Finally, the U.S. must continue its investment in chemical and biological defense. If CBW defense equipment can mitigate the effects of a CBW attack, the adversary may see no advantage in using weapons of mass destruction.
Ultimately, the aim of U.S. CBW retaliation policy is deterrence. Although an element of ambiguity certainly can serve to enhance deterrence by keeping one's adversaries guessing about the response to an attack, it seems more likely that the U.S. is stuck with the current approach because there hasn't been much of the hard thinking needed to devise a more robust policy. In other words, the current policy of calculated ambiguity-with its over-reliance on the nuclear -big stick"-is a -cop out." The U.S. is paying full price for today's half-policy. What is the result of today's flawed policy?
Military forces may be strategically unprepared to respond when the time comes. To redress this situation, this paper demonstrated the shortfalls of the current policy, suggested ways to clarify the policy, and proposed a four-variable strategic-analytic framework of considerations for strategy development. These four variables could be used to shape and mold a new direction for U.S. CBW retaliation policy.
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, in the days following the cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan, said the U.S. strikes -…have made it clear that those who attack or target the United States cannot do so with impunity." 53 To back up this rhetoric with a credible deterrent threat requires the U.S. to have a robust, wellconsidered retaliation policy. Without a viable reprisal policy, the U.S is fated to fall victim to -the panic of the moment."
Notes
